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Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl
Christopher Deluzio*
Introduction
Adoption policy in the United States has unequivocally embraced
the idea that every child, irrespective of race, has an equal right to a
loving home and supportive parents. To that end, public adoption
agencies and family courts are largely barred from considering the race
of either the child or the couple seeking adoption when deciding custody
and placement issues. But there is one dramatic exception to this
colorblindness: the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).
The ICWA is a radical and lingering departure from the steady
embrace of colorblindness by both Congress and the Court. The Act
creates heightened federal standards for termination of parental rights of
an Indian parent, gives placement preference to tribe members and others
in cases involving the placement of Indian children, and even extends
jurisdiction—often exclusive—to tribes in certain custody and adoption
proceedings.
The divisive nature and tenuous constitutional footing of the ICWA
were on full display most recently in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.1 In
this heart-wrenching and widely publicized case,2 the Court tackled the
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard J. Sullivan, United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. magna cum
laude (2013); United States Naval Academy, B.S. with merit (2006). First and foremost, I
would like to thank Jeffrey Shulman for his unwavering mentorship and direction. I
would also like to thank Peter Edelman, Michael Gottesman, Neal Katyal, and Nicholas
Quinn Rosenkranz at Georgetown Law for their steadfast support. As with every
endeavor, I am deeply indebted to Zoë Bunnell for her love, patience, and counsel.
1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Send Veronica Back: A Truly Terrible Ruling in the
Baby
Girl
Custody
Case,
SLATE
(Jul.
18,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/07/baby_veronica_case_the_south
_carolina_court_got_it_wrong.html; Andrew Cohen, What the Court’s ‘Baby Veronica’
Ruling Means for Fathers and Native Americans, ATLANTIC (Jun. 25, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/what-the-courts-baby-veronica-
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issue of whether the ICWA would operate to bar the adoption of a child
with only 3/256 Cherokee blood by an adoptive couple personally
selected by the child’s unwed biological mother. Effectively, before the
United States Supreme Court’s decision, the South Carolina state courts
felt compelled by the ICWA to grant custody to the child’s putative
father solely because of the child’s Indian heritage, despite a family
court’s finding that the adoption would have been in the best interests of
the child. Worse, the child had spent over a year with the couple and
formed strong familial bonds with her adoptive parents.
Unlike other federal laws designed to protect and reinforce the selfgovernance of tribes—rooted in the tribes’ inherent sovereignty and
subjected to lower rational basis review—the ICWA in Adoptive Couple
acted as a naked racial preference for those with Indian blood. The child
at issue was not born to an Indian mother, had never met her biological
father until his intervention in the adoption proceedings, and had never
even stepped foot on a reservation prior to her adoption. The Supreme
Court, seeking to avoid the difficult and obvious equal protection issues
implicated in Adoptive Couple, inexplicably failed to acknowledge
ICWA for what it was in this case: an inherently racial classification that
should have been subjected to and failed strict scrutiny. Unfortunately,
the Court never exposed ICWA to that kind of scrutiny; instead, the
Court avoided the obvious constitutional questions raised by ICWA by
relying on creative textual interpretation.
Part I will provide an overview of the legal doctrines implicated in
Adoptive Couple. First, Part I will discuss both ICWA’s text and purpose
and scholarly attention given to the law. Second, Part I will examine the
law of putative fathers insofar as relevant to understanding ICWA’s
application in Adoptive Couple. Part II provides insight into the Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence with a particular emphasis on
considerations of race in adoption and laws implicating Indian tribes.
This Part introduces the limited scholarly treatment afforded to the equal
protection issues implicated by ICWA and builds on the existing work
that recognizes the inherently racial nature of any tribal classification.
Part III tells the intriguing story of Adoptive Couple by providing a
ruling-means-for-fathers-and-native-americans/277215/; Dan Frosch & Timothy
Williams, Justices Saw Law Doesn’t Require Child to be Returned to her Indian Father,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/justices-orderreturn-of-indian-child-to-adoptive-parents.html; S.M., The Native American Adoption
Case:
Thicker
than
Water,
ECONOMIST
(Jun.
12,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/native-americanadoption-case.
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factual overview of the case, presenting the procedural history of the
dispute, and summarizing the parties’ arguments before the Supreme
Court. Lastly, Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple.
Incorporating the themes developed throughout this Article, Part IV
critically examines the Court’s failure to resolve the putative father and
equal protection issues raised in Adoptive Couple. Part IV suggests how
the Court should have resolved Adoptive Couple in a constitutionally and
doctrinally satisfying way while identifying some of the perils and
repercussions of the Court’s judicial minimalism. This Part also includes
a brief epilogue that provides an update to the status of Baby Girl’s
adoption.
I.

Legal Background

This Part provides an overview of the legal doctrines and
jurisprudence at play in Adoptive Couple.3 Section A begins with a
discussion of the text and purpose of the ICWA before turning to an
analysis of the contentious judicially crafted “existed Indian family
doctrine” exception to the ICWA. Section B examines the law of putative
fathers, first under the ICWA and, second, under the Supreme Court’s
landmark decisions.
A. ICWA
Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 in response to the breakdown of
Indian families caused by the removal of Indian children via state
custody proceedings.4 In passing the ICWA, Congress laid out a broad
and lofty policy of protecting Indian children, promoting Indian tribal
identity, and preserving Indian culture. The ICWA established minimum
federal guidelines for Indian child custody proceedings. Unfortunately,
the ICWA has caused uncertainty about both the applicability of its
provisions to non-custodial Indian parents—as evidenced by the
emergence of a judicially-created “existing Indian family doctrine”—and
the steps unwed Indian fathers must take in order to enjoy the
3. Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. 2552.
4. See Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012)
(finding “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the
removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private
agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”).
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preferential treatment afforded by the ICWA. Section B addresses this
latter concern relating to putative fathers. The constitutional equal
protection objections and concerns posed by the ICWA are reserved for
discussion in Part II.
1. Purpose and Provisions of the ICWA
Congress, in passing the ICWA, charted an intrusive federal role in
the protection of Indian children, families, and tribal identity:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of
this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.5
This active and seemingly intrusive federal involvement by Congress
was couched in the general obligation of the United States to protect and
preserve Indian tribes.6 Even a cursory review of the legislative history
of the ICWA confirms that much of the congressional concern focused
on the harm experienced by Indian children and their families.7 The
5. Id. § 1902.
6. Id. § 1901(2) (“Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of
dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources.”).
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7531 (“The wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps
the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.”); id. (“In addition
to the trauma of separation from their families, most Indian children in placement or in
institutions have to cope with the problems of adjusting to a social and cultural
environment much different than their own.”); id. at 10, 7532 (“In judging the fitness of a
particular family, many social workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social
norms, make decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life
and so they frequently discover neglect or abandonment where none exists.”); S. REP.
NO. 95-597, at 11 (1977) (stating that the ICWA was motivated by “reports that an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian children were being separated from their natural
parents through the actions of nontribal government agencies”).
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Supreme Court has also noted that Congress, via the ICWA, aimed to
remedy the harm caused by the breakdown of Indian families:
The . . . ICWA . . . was the product of rising concern in
the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive
child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of
large numbers of Indian children from their families and
tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually
in non-Indian homes.8
More specifically, Congress zeroed in on the effects of custody
proceedings in the States on Indian families, finding “that the States,
exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed
to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”9 In
order to remedy these destructive forces in the States, the ICWA
included implementation of “minimum Federal standards” governing the
removal of Indian children from Indian families. As such, the ICWA is
best characterized as an atypical foray by the federal government into
substantive family law, which the Court has typically characterized as
the exclusive domain of the States.10
The ICWA’s substantive provisions apply to child custody
proceedings in the states involving an “Indian Child,” which the ICWA
defines as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either
(a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”11
A “parent” under the ICWA is “any biological parent or parents of an
8. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989); see also id.
at 34 (noting that congressional testimony during the debates surrounding passage of the
ICWA included significant focus “on the harm to Indian parents and their children who
were involuntarily separated by decisions of local welfare authorities”); id. at 55
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Act is thus primarily addressed to the unjustified removal
of Indian children from their families through the application of standards that
inadequately recognized the distinct Indian culture.”).
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
10. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“The whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890))).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian
child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom.”12 However, the
ICWA’s definition of parent “does not include the unwed father where
paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”13
Relevant to adoption proceedings, the ICWA significantly restricts
the ability of state courts to terminate a “parent’s” custody rights without
consent:
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.14
The ICWA also gives adoption placement preferences to the extended
family of the Indian child and other tribal members.15 The ICWA also
provides Indian tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings involving Indian children domiciled or residing on the
tribe’s reservation,16 transfer to Indian tribes of proceedings to terminate
the parental rights to an Indian child (subject to parental objection),17 and
Indian tribes with the right to intervene in proceedings to terminate the
12. Id. § 1903(9).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1912(f) (emphasis added).
15. See id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a
placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the
Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”).
16. See id. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any
State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal
court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or
domicile of the child.”).
17. See id. § 1911(b) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within
the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection
by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian
child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal
court of such tribe.”).
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parental rights to an Indian child.18
Thus, state courts dealing with the adoption of an Indian child must
apply a high federal standard of harm despite any contrary state law,
consider the ICWA’s tribal placement preferences, allow Indian tribes to
intervene, and transfer to Indian tribes if neither parent objects and a
parent, custodian, or tribe petitions the court. And for children residing or
domiciled on a reservation, Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over
all child custody proceedings.
2. Existing Indian Family Doctrine
The “existing Indian family doctrine”—a judicially crafted
exception to the ICWA—limits the reach of the ICWA to only Indian
children being removed from the existing custody of an Indian parent or
family.19 The doctrine first emerged in a 1982 decision by the Kansas
Supreme Court:
A careful study of the legislative history behind the
[Indian Child Welfare] Act and the Act itself discloses
that the overriding concern of Congress and the
proponents of the Act was the maintenance of the family
and tribal relationships existing in Indian homes and to
set minimum standards for the removal of Indian
children from their existing Indian environment. It was
not to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never
been a member of an Indian home or culture, and
probably never would be, should be removed from its
primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian
18. See id. § 1911(c) (“In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child
and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the
proceeding.”).
19. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act: Toward A New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 676
n.8 (2002) (“Under the existing Indian family exception, several state courts have refused
to apply the ICWA to children who otherwise qualify as Indian children under the Act,
where neither the child nor the child's parents have a social, cultural, or political
relationship with a tribe.”); Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L. REV. 465, 472 (1993) (describing the existing
Indian family doctrine as “an exception based on the notion that the ICWA will only be
applicable if an Indian child is removed from an ‘existing Indian family unit’ or ‘Indian
home or culture’”).
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environment over the express objections of its nonIndian mother.20
A court adhering to the doctrine and presiding over a parent termination
proceeding, for instance, would not apply the ICWA’s substantive
provisions to a parental termination proceeding, for instance, where the
Indian child at issue was not already in the custody of an Indian parent.
Although Kansas ultimately abandoned the doctrine,21 at least seven
states currently embrace the existing Indian family doctrine: Alabama, 22
Kentucky,23 Indiana,24 Louisiana,25 Missouri,26 Nevada,27 and
Tennessee.28
The doctrine has received some attention from scholars, and this
commentary has been almost uniformly critical.29 The principal objection
to the doctrine attacks the judicial exemption as both a departure from
the plain text of the ICWA and an infringement of tribal sovereignty.
Professor Atwood, for instance, who provides an excellent discussion of
the two-pronged objections to the doctrine, summarizes things quite
nicely: “The exception, which rewrites the Act’s definition of ‘Indian
child’ without statutory basis, undercuts the sovereign authority of tribes
to determine their own membership.”30
The sovereignty-based criticisms of the existing Indian family
doctrine suggest that the doctrine undermines the authority of tribes to
20. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In
re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 551 (Kan. 2009).
21. See In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d at 551.
22. See S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
23. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996).
24. See J.Q. v. D.R.L., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988).
25. See Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
26. See In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608-9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
27. See Dawn v. Nev. State Div. of Child & Family Servs., 221 P.3d 1255, 1264
(Nev. 2009).
28. See In re K.L.D.R., No. M2008-00897-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1138130, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009).
29. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 19, at 589-90; Davis, supra note 19, at 471-72;
Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes:” A Contextual Critique of the Existing
Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1998); Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne,
One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the “Existing Indian Family” Exception
(Re)Imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the Detriment
of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329 (2009); Wendy Therese Parnell,
Comment, The Existing Indian Family Exception: Denying Tribal Rights Protected by the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 381 (1997).
30. Atwood, supra note 19, at 634 (emphasis added).
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determine their own membership pursuant to their statutory authority in
the field. Opponents attacking the doctrine on this front, such as
Professor Atwood, argue that such a usurpation of power by state courts
is an affront to tribal authority in contravention of congressional intent:
The primary objection to the doctrine is that it disregards
the interests of the tribe under the ICWA and denies to
tribes the sovereign right to determine membership. .
..The right of Indian tribes to maintain a relationship
with children eligible for membership was a central
concern of Congress in enacting the ICWA, and the
existing Indian family exception thwarts that interest.
Thus, in the view of the courts that have rejected the
doctrine, the existing Indian family exception directly
conflicts with the idea of tribal sovereignty and the goal
of strengthening tribal relations. Further, in allowing
state courts to assess the sufficiency of an individual’s
ties with his or her Indian heritage, the doctrine invites
precisely the kind of state court interference and
paternalism that the ICWA was intended to eliminate.31
Similarly, Professor Davis stresses the contravention of congressional
policy inherent in judicial adoption of the doctrine:
[I]t is clear that Congress was concerned about the rights
of Indian children, Indian families, and Indian
communities vis-a-vis states and their courts: “More
specifically, its purpose was, in part, to make clear that
in certain situations the state courts did not have
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.” Contrary to
this purpose, the existing Indian family exception has
been used to evade applicability of the Act and to
confine a variety of cases concerning Indian children,
their families, and tribes in the state courts under state
law.32
31. Id. at 632-33 (footnote omitted); see also Parnell, supra note 29, at 420 (“Courts
adopting the exception fail or refuse to recognize the tribal interests Congress intended to
protect in enacting the ICWA.”).
32. Davis, supra note 19, at 495 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 400 U.S. 30, 45 (1989); see also Graham, supra note 29, at 36
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Professor Painter-Thorne goes so far as to suggest that state courts
applying the doctrine are perpetuating the wrongs that the ICWA was
designed to correct and prevent:
[W]hen state courts use the exiting Indian family
exception to avoid ICWA, they perpetuate the very
injustice ICWA sought to remedy by permitting
nontribal members to determine the boundaries of Indian
families. Such efforts may pressure tribal courts to
conform to an outsider’s cultural perspective by
minimizing extended kin roles to fit within the nuclear
family framework so as to assuage state court concerns.
Moreover, these decisions have the potential to further
alter Indian kinship structures. . .so that it even more
closely resembles the Anglo-American model, not as a
consequence of cultural choice, but as a means to avoid
state usurpation of tribal jurisdiction.33
The textual objection to the existing Indian family doctrine accuses
state courts of ignoring the plain meaning of the text of the ICWA in
order to maintain state court jurisdiction over Indian child custody cases.
For instance, Professor Metteer argues that “instead of relying on the
Act’s own definitions of ‘Indian child’ and Indian ‘tribal member,’ the
courts have devised a ‘second litmus test’ to manipulate the application
and implementation of the Act by variously defining their own criteria
for ‘Indian-ness.’”34 Professor Davis also highlighted the argument that
courts applying the doctrine are departing from the text of the ICWA:
When there is no “existing Indian family” from which an
Indian child is being removed, proponents of the
exception argue, the ICWA is inapplicable. This

(“Every Indian nation has its own membership or citizenship criteria which may be
determined by ‘written law, custom, intertribal agreement, or treaty with the United
States.’ The Existing Indian Family Doctrine, which allows state courts and agencies to
substitute their views of what ‘belonging’ to a tribal family means for that of the tribe's
views, thwarts this essential function of tribal sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)).
33. Painter-Thorne, supra note 29, at 380.
34. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 429 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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argument is made despite the fact that the two threshold
requirements for applicability of the ICWA—1) that the
matter involves an Indian child, and 2) in a child custody
proceeding—are fulfilled, and despite the fact that there
is no language in the Act which indicates removal from
an Indian family as a requirement.35
Professor Painter-Thorne also echoes these textual objections by arguing
that “state courts [that apply the doctrine] are imposing a requirement for
ICWA application that goes beyond the Act’s plain-language
requirements.”36
These are but a representative sampling of the main objections to
the existing Indian family doctrine. While a determination about the
merits of these objections is beyond the scope of this Article, an
understanding of the doctrine and the principal arguments against it is
necessary to fully appreciate the issues presented by the ICWA, its
application, and the route taken by the Court in Adoptive Couple.

B. The Rights of Putative Fathers
This section provides a brief overview of the rights of putative
fathers and focuses on the steps necessary for putative fathers to gain and
protect their parental rights. These steps almost always exceed those
required of married fathers and unwed mothers. Additionally, the
determination of the requirements placed on putative fathers seeking to
affirm their parental rights is almost entirely the province of the several
states. Given Biological Father’s status as a putative father and the
prominence of the question of what steps he was required to take in order
to qualify as a “parent” under the ICWA, this Part is crucial to
appreciating fully the range of issues at play in Adoptive Couple (despite
the Court’s decision to brush aside this crucial threshold issue in

35. Davis, supra note 19, at 476; see also Graham, supra note 29, at 35 (“Courts
and advocates alike have maintained that the Doctrine violates the plain meaning of the
ICWA, which states that the law will apply to "custody proceedings" involving "Indian
children" who are either a member of their tribe or eligible for membership. There is no
statutory requirement that the child or parent meet any additional test of "Indian-ness"
beyond membership.”).
36. Painter-Thorne, supra note 29, at 376 (emphasis added).
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Adoptive Couple).37 Subsection 1 examines the ICWA’s relevant
provisions and scholarly commentary, while Subsection 2 delves into the
Court’s broader putative father doctrine.
1. ICWA
Despite the ICWA’s inclusion of a definition of “parent” in its
express terms, some states have diverged in their approaches for
determining the parental status of fathers under the ICWA. Recall that
the ICWA excludes from its definition of parents “the unwed father
where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.”38 It is this
exclusion that has caused confusion for some state courts about whether
the ICWA incorporates a State’s definition of parenthood for unwed
biological fathers (or, for purposes of this Article, putative fathers39),
particularly because the ICWA is silent with respect to the steps putative
fathers are required to take in order to “acknowledge” or “establish” their
paternity.
Five states have held that a determination of parental rights for
putative fathers under the ICWA requires a determination under state
paternity laws. Those states—California,40 Missouri,41 New Jersey,42
Oklahoma,43 and Texas44—include three of the four states with the
largest Indian populations in the United States, according to the 2010
Census.45 On the other hand, Alaska,46 Arizona (the state with the third
37. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
39. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009) (defining putative father as
“[t]he alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock”).
40. See In re Daniel M. v. Richard S., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(“Moreover, because the ICWA does not provide a standard for the acknowledgment or
establishment of paternity, courts have resolved the issue under state law.”).
41. See In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 607 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting
that state law controls any paternity determination in a case under the ICWA).
42. See In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988)
(“In light of . . . the failure of either the Act or its interpretive regulations to prescribe or
define a particular method of acknowledging or establishing paternity, we infer a
legislative intent to have the acknowledgment or establishment of paternity determined
by state law.”).
43. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 1101 (Okla. 2004).
44. See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 173 (Tex. App. 1995)
(“Congress intended to have the issue of acknowledgment or establishment of paternity
determined by state law.”).
45. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE
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largest Indian population47),48 and South Carolina49 do not look to their
state laws when determining whether paternity has been “acknowledged”
or “established” under the ICWA.
There has been silence in the academic discourse surrounding this
disagreement among the states about how to define paternity under the
ICWA. Regardless, this split affects a large portion of the Nation’s
Indian population and has muddied the waters for putative Indian fathers
affected by, for instance, termination or adoption proceedings. The
Court’s putative fathers jurisprudence will contribute to this Article’s
critical analysis in Part IV of the Court’s decision.
2. United States Supreme Court Doctrine
Putative fathers—one who is “[t]he alleged biological father of a
child born out of wedlock”50—have historically had fewer rights than
both married fathers and unwed mothers. In the last few decades,
however, putative fathers who have established relationships with their
children have increasingly convinced the Court of the fundamental
nature of their parental rights. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services has described the Court’s approach to the rights of
putative fathers quite well:
In a series of cases involving unmarried fathers, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional protection of
such a father’s parental rights when he has established a
substantial relationship with his child. The court found
POPULATION:
2010,
at
7
tbl.2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf
[hereinafter
CENSUS
BUREAU].
46. See Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011) (“[E]ven though Bruce
did not comply with the Alaska legitimation statute requiring signatures from both
parents or complete his legitimization efforts in court within the first year of Timothy's
life, he sufficiently acknowledged paternity of Timothy to invoke the application of
ICWA.”) (footnote omitted).
47. See CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 45, at tbl.2.
48. See Michael J., Jr. v. Michael J., Sr., 7 P.3d 960, 963 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that compliance with state law paternity requirements “are not required” under
the ICWA).
49. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012), vacated,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), remanded to 746 S.E.2d 346 (S.C. 2013); see also infra Part II.B,
discussing South Carolina state proceedings.
50. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 683.
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that the existence of a biological link between a child
and an unmarried father gives the father the opportunity
to establish a substantial relationship, which it defined as
the father’s commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, as demonstrated by being involved or
attempting to be involved in the child’s upbringing.
Nevertheless, States have almost complete discretion to
determine the rights of unmarried fathers whose legal
relationship to a child has not been established for the
purposes of termination of parental rights or adoption
proceedings.51
The most important inquiry for courts considering the rights of putative
fathers, then, is whether the father has established a substantial
relationship with the child. Thus, “unwed fathers have an inchoate
interest in their children which they can transform into a constitutionally
protected interest only if they assume substantial parental
responsibilities.”52 To that end, states are compelled by the Federal
Social Security Act to have procedures for putative fathers to
acknowledge paternity.53
This putative father doctrine is the result of a series of Supreme
Court decisions, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois54 in 1972. In Stanley,
the Court held that Illinois could not remove children, who had lived
with their father over a period of several years,55 from the custody of a
putative father after the death of the child’s mother “without a hearing on
parental fitness and without proof of neglect.”56 Next, in Quilloin v.
51. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 2 (2010) available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/putative.pdf [hereinafter
CHILD WELFARE INFO] (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
52. Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1056-57 (2002).
53. See CHILD WELFARE INFO., supra note 51 at 3 n.5 (“The Federal Social Security
Act requires States to have in place procedures for mothers and putative fathers to
acknowledge paternity of a child, including a hospital-based program for the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity that focuses on the period immediately before or after the
birth of the child. The procedures must include that, before they can sign an affidavit of
paternity, the mother and putative father will be given notice of the alternatives and legal
consequences that arise from signing the acknowledgment.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
666(a)(5) (2012).
54. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
55. Id. at 650 n.4.
56. Id. at 658.
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Walcott,57 while the Court recognized “that the relationship between
parent and child is constitutionally protected,”58 the Court ultimately held
that Georgia’s application of a “best interests of the child”59 standard in
adoption proceedings did not violate the rights of a putative father who
had “never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus . . .
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child.”60
Then, in Caban v. Mohammed,61 the Court struck down a New York
law providing that only a mother’s consent, and not a putative father’s,
was required in adoption proceedings over children born out of
wedlock.62 The Caban Court noted that the putative father in the case had
“established a substantial relationship with the child and . . . admitted his
paternity,”63 but the Court also noted that New York would be free to
eradicate a putative father’s veto over adoption if the father had “never. .
.come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.”64 And in Lehr v.
Robertson,65 the Court held that New York was not constitutionally
required to give notice of adoption to a putative father who “never
established any custodial, personal, or financial relationship with”66 the
child, thereby failing to establish a substantial relationship,67 and who
failed to file with New York’s putative father registry.68
Central to the Court’s jurisprudence on putative fathers is the idea
that the biological link between putative father and child only provides
the father with an opportunity to have a role in the child’s life. More is
required of a father if he is to gain the protection of the Constitution. As
the Court noted in Lehr:
57. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
58. Id. at 255.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id. at 256.
61. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
62. Id. at 392.
63. Id. at 393.
64. Id. at 392.
65. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
66. Id. at 267-68.
67. Id. at 266-68.
68. See id. at 263-65. The Court’s other major putative fatherhood case is Michael
H. v. Gerald D. 491 U.S. 110, 130-32 (1989) (examining the liberty interest of the child
in maintaining her filial relationship and finding that a California law creating a
presumption of paternity for the man married to and cohabitating with the mother of the
child could block a biological father attempting to assert his own paternity and establish a
relationship with the child).
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The significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some
measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a state to
listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests
lie.69
Similarly, June Carbone succinctly synthesized the Court’s putative
father doctrine by noting that the Lehr decision, authored by Justice
Stevens, “united the Supreme Court’s conflicting decisions on
fatherhood by taking the existence of a paternal relationship as a given. If
a father’s relationship with his children is a substantial one, that
relationship merits constitutional protection. If not, the inquiry ends
there.”70 The doctrine has, as well, spawned a significant amount of
scholarly attention.71
This thinking—that the mere act of fathering a child, without more
subsequent involvement, provides only an opportunity for the putative
father to have a role in the interests of the child—is unsurprisingly
reflected in the ICWA’s exclusion from its definition of parent “the
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or
established.”72 Thus, the Court’s putative father doctrine, at a minimum,
provides a gloss on the proper understanding the ICWA and its
application in Adoptive Couple.

69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (footnote omitted).
70. June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model
of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1999).
71. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the
Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1322-28 (2005); Marsha Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 885-89 (2000); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of
the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 919-27 (1984).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
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The Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Race, Family
Law, & Indian Tribes

Before turning to the rich factual story and nuanced legal issues of
Adoptive Couple, a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and its
impact on race as a factor in adoption is appropriate in order to
understand the full gravity of the constitutional issues at play. This Part
provides an overview and survey of the Court’s Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence insofar as it is relevant to the consideration of race and
tribal status in the context of adoption. First, Section A explores race as a
factor in adoption, focusing on the approaches of the Court and Congress
with respect to race in adoption. Section B then turns to the Court’s much
more deferential approach to laws aimed at Indian tribes when
considered through the lens of equal protection. Section B also discusses
a sampling of the leading, albeit limited, scholarly discussion of the
ICWA and its Equal Protection Clause implications.73 This Part presents
a picture of the ICWA as a doctrinal anomaly that stands alone, in certain
applications, as a naked racial classification and preference in the
otherwise colorblind world of adoption. Part III’s discussion of the facts
and legal issues at play in Adoptive Couple will set the stage for Part IV’s
critical analysis of the Adoptive Couple Court’s failure both to subject
the ICWA to strict scrutiny and ultimately strike it down, as-applied, as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
A. The Intersection of Race and Adoption
The Court first entertained the idea of subjecting laws that draw
racial distinctions to a strict level of scrutiny in the famous footnote four
of Carolene Products. Justice Stone suggested that a higher level of
scrutiny might be appropriate in cases dealing with minority groups:
“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”74
73. For example, in a forthcoming article about colorblindness in family law, Katie
Eyer omits full discussion of the ICWA beyond cursory mention of what the Court might
do in Adoptive Couple. See Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family,
162 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4 n.9, 50-53), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185728.
74. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Eventually, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, formally
embraced the strict scrutiny standard of review for racial classifications
in the notorious Korematsu v. United States decision: “[A]ll legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.”75
A complete survey and analysis of the subsequent Supreme Court
decisions that have come to shape and refine the Court’s approach to
judicial review of racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause
are beyond the scope of this Article. There is a plethora of scholarship
debating the Court’s doctrinal embrace of colorblindness,76 and the
Roberts Court’s recent opinion in Fisher is the most recent example of
the Court’s seeming distaste for racial classifications of any kind. 77
Despite this, a brief discussion of the Court’s handling of race as a factor
in adoption proceedings is appropriate to highlight briefly colorblindness
in the specific context of adoption.
The judiciary’s disdain for the consideration of race in adoption,
custody, and foster placements has been more nuanced and ambivalent
than Congress’s 1996 decision, discussed infra. For instance, Andrew
Morrison noted the inconsistent approaches of courts dealing with the
question of the permissibility of race as a factor in adoption cases:
The cases addressing the constitutionality of using race
in the adoption process are not entirely consistent.
However, the courts have generally held “race should be
considered, but may not be a controlling factor in
determining the best interest of the child.” The majority
of cases that address constitutional challenges to the use
of race in adoption apply strict scrutiny analysis.78

75. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); Christopher
W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2008);
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99 (1986); Laurence
H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 201 (1986); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get
Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.”, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1979);
Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1974) .
77. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
78. Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: The Pros and Cons of the Parents’
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Despite this seeming inconsistency, the Supreme Court held in 1984 that
consideration of race in a child custody dispute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.79 In Palmore, the Court considered
a state court’s decision to remove a child from the custody of his mother
solely because the mother was in an interracial marriage.80 Applying
strict scrutiny analysis, the Court found that “the reality of private
[racial] biases and the possible injury they might inflict” were
impermissible considerations in a custody dispute and that such a racial
classification ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.81 Thus, the Court
noted that while “[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices . . .
neither can it tolerate them.”82 Palmore is by far the Court’s most direct
decision on the issue of race as a factor in adoption and placement
proceedings, and the obvious reading of the case leads to the conclusion
that colorblindness in custody disputes is consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, if not constitutionally mandated.
Similarly, on the legislative side of things, Congress has expressed
clearly its distaste for consideration of race as a factor in adoption. From
at least 1996 onward, the policy of the United States has been to bar, in
almost all circumstances, consideration of race as a factor in adoption
proceedings. Congress legislated to this end via a 1996 amendment to the
Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) of 1994, which applies to any child
welfare agency receiving federal funds.83 According to John Myers,
“[o]nly in narrow circumstances, where the needs of a specific child
make race important, can social workers consider race as a factor.”84 The
Harvard Law Review’s analysis of the MEPA amendments captured the
unequivocal decision of Congress to remove race as a factor in adoptions
and other types of placements:
With bipartisan support, little public opposition, and
Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 167, 175 (2004) (quoting Rita J. Simon &
Howard Alstein, The Relevance of Race in Adoption Law and Social Practice, 11 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 171, 175 (1997)).
79. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984).
80. See id. at 430-31.
81. Id. at 433.
82. Id.
83. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808,
110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
84. JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD PROTECTION IN AMERICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
102 (2006).
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minimal fanfare, the 104th Congress moved to end the
longstanding practice of matching adoptive parents and
children according to race. Repealing a previous federal
statute that explicitly allowed consideration of race as a
factor in placement determinations, the Small Business
Jobs Protection Act (SBJPA) makes clear that adoption
agencies can no longer use race to delay or deny
adoptive placement.85
More specifically, no State or associated entities that receive federal
funds and are involved in adoption or foster care placements may “deny
to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent, on
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the person, or of the
child, involved.”86 Such recipients of federal funds also may not “delay
or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the
basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent,
or the child, involved.”87 The 1996 amendment to MEPA inserted these
exact same prohibitions against the consideration of race in adoption and
foster care placement in 42 U.S.C. § 1996b, but the prohibitions in this
section apply more broadly to any “person or government that is
involved in adoption or foster care placements.”88 Unsurprisingly,
Congress’s 1996 amendments explicitly exempted the ICWA from the
prohibitions against the consideration of race, further cementing the
ICWA’s unique position as an outlier in an otherwise colorblind world of
adoption law.89
B. Laws Implicating Indian Tribes
Indian tribes have long held an uncertain and uncomfortable
position in the legal landscape of the United States throughout its history,
prompting serious debate about what sovereignty truly means for tribes.
In this sense, the quasi-sovereignty of tribes places them in a unique

85. Recent Legislation, Transracial Adoption—Congress Forbids Use of Race As a
Factor in Adoptive Placement Decisions—Small Business Jobs Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, S 1808 (1996), 110 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1352 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 671(18)(A) (2012).
87. Id. § 671(18)(B).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (2012).
89. Id. §1996b(3) (“This subsection shall not be construed to affect the application
of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.”).
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position constitutionally speaking. The tension between this notion of
tribal sovereignty and the ancestral and racial heritage of tribal members
raises the most serious equal protection concerns. In trying to resolve this
tension, the Supreme Court has come down largely on the side of tribal
sovereignty, subjecting laws that confer benefits on tribes or subject
them to preferential treatment to a low, rational basis, level of scrutiny.
This section will first examine the Court’s approach to equal protection
challenges to laws implicating Indian tribes and discuss some of the
scholarly discussion surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction. Next, this
section will briefly point to the lack of interest by the Court and
academia in the ICWA’s equal protection flaws.
1. Sovereigns, a Racial Group, or Both?
Prior to Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court made clear that
“classifications based on Indian tribal membership are not impermissible
racial classification.”90 The Court based this conclusion on the concept of
tribal sovereignty, whereby classifications affecting tribal members were
deemed to be firmly non-racial ones.91 This doctrinal move allowed the
Court to avoid a more critical examination of such laws that would have
otherwise demanded strict scrutiny because of their racially divisive
nature.
The Court’s pivotal decision on this racial-sovereign dichotomy
came in 1974 in Morton v. Mancari.92 The Morton Court was faced with
a challenge to a law that provided employment preferences to Indians
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.93 With respect to the equal
protection issues posed by the preferences, the Court explicitly declined
to characterize classifications of Indians as racial and instead keyed in on
the enhancement of tribal self-government: “Contrary to the
characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute
‘racial discrimination.’ Indeed, it is not even a ‘racial’ preference.
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the
cause of Indian self-government . . . .”94 Further, the Court also found
90. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2584 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974)).
91. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584.
92. Morton, 417 U.S. 535.
93. Id. at 537-41.
94. Id. at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
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that “[t]he preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities
whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion.”95 Lest there be any doubt regarding the appropriate level of
judicial review applicable to Indian classifications, the Court
unequivocally announced that rational basis would apply: “As long as the
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not
be disturbed.”96 Neil Jessup Newton characterized this deferential
approach as permitting almost any kind of legislative action:
Because the judiciary has defined congressional
authority over Indians so broadly, application of this
deferential standard of review to Indian legislation
permits almost any conceivable legislative action. In
short, if the permissible statutory purpose is to manage
Indian affairs, any legislation affecting Indians, almost
by definition, would be rationally related to that
purpose.97
While later noting that the law is “settled that ‘the unique legal
status of Indian tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government
to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might
otherwise be constitutionally offensive,” the Court again stressed that
tribal classifications were permissible.98 However, David Williams has
argued that the Court might have implicitly drawn a distinction between
the racial and tribal usages of the term Indian:
The Supreme Court, moreover, did not intend to argue
that “Indian” can never be a racial term. Rather, the
Court carefully distinguished between two usages of the
95. Id. at 554.
96. Id. at 555.
97. Neil Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 242 (1984) (emphasis added).
98. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 500-01 (1979) (quoting Mortin v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974)); see
also United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-49 (1977) (reaffirming Mancari’s
deferential approach toward federal laws with respect to tribes, rejecting equal protection
challenges to such legislative efforts, and dismissing attempts to characterize laws
affecting tribes as impermissible racial classifications).
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term—racial and political. Mancari, for example,
opposed a “‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians”‘ to a
category that includes only “members of ‘federally
recognized’ tribes” and excludes “many individuals who
are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’” It is therefore
possible, in the Court’s mind, to think of Indians in a
racial light and so use the category with a racial
meaning. Apparently, however, the racial usage is
confined to the general category “Indian,” meaning all
Indians; one cannot use the category “enrolled members
of the Navajo Nation” in a racial sense. As long as the
government confines itself to “legislation singling out
tribal Indians,” it is on safe ground.99
This racial-tribal distinction, according to the Court, might have
profound constitutional significance, but Williams persuasively argues
that one cannot divorce the racial component of “Indian” from its tribal
one:
Virtually all of the federal definitions of “Indian”
contain, to the naked eye, a substantial genetic and
therefore racial component. In Mancari, for example, the
BIA regulations required that to be eligible for the
preference, “an individual must be one-fourth or more
degree Indian blood and be a member of a federally
recognized tribe.” At most, this definition contains one
political element—membership in a federally-recognized
tribe. But the preference also has a second and openly
genetic requirement that has nothing to do with politics.
If one were a member of a recognized tribe but had less
than one-fourth Indian blood, then one would not qualify
for the preference strictly because one did not have
enough Indian genetic material. Tying legal benefits to
this kind of racial calibration has historically been
associated with racism at its most despicable; consider
the distinctions in this country between “octoroons” and
“mulattos,” and in South Africa between “blacks” and

99. David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians As
Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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“coloreds.” It should make us nervous; it should not be
shrugged off with the blithe assertion that it is all
political. In most federal definitions, then, the category
“Indian” is both political and racial. The simple fact that
race is one element may not close the analysis; one
might still argue that, by combining the two factors, the
government can somehow remove the constitutional
taint from the racial factor. But to retain any honesty, the
Court must acknowledge that the classification is
partially racial.100
Williams’ position is a strong one: any classification based on tribal
status inherently relies on a racial one, as well, because membership in
Indian tribes is linked to a person’s racial heritage. Williams is not alone
in identifying this problematic element of the Court’s approach.101 Carole
Goldberg, however, takes a more critical view of attempts to characterize
tribal classifications—what she calls “racialization”—as racial ones in
order to trigger strict scrutiny:
While the U.S. Supreme Court historically used
racialization to establish Indians’ inferiority and to
justify dominant society controls, today’s courts, I
contend, use racialization to trigger strict scrutiny under
equal protection law and thereby to deny Indians the
benefit of federal measures enacted to compensate for or
reverse prior harms. The courts allow Indians to escape
this result only by proving up their identity in cultural
terms that satisfy non-Indians’ criteria for “Indianness.”
If the Indians cannot do so, the courts deny them legal
rights otherwise available to them as tribal members and
Indians, thereby challenging their identities as well.
Some legal scholars are joining this misguided call for
cultural tests establishing Indian identity and entitlement
to special federal legislation.102
100. Id. at 794-95 (footnotes omitted).
101. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996). But see, e.g.,
Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as
Peoples,” 39 UCLA L. REV. 169 (1991).
102. Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2002)
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While Goldberg concedes that tribal citizenship is largely dependent on
“the circumstances of one’s birth,” she nonetheless argues that “this leap
from the fact of descent-based tribal citizenship into legal doctrines of
race is both regrettable and unnecessary, given the alternative that both
positive law and constitutional interpretation permit.”103 Under
Goldberg’s view, both the Constitution and political theory lend support
to “treating Indian classifications outside the conventional framework of
race, so long as those classifications are directed toward fulfillment of
unique obligations that the federal government owes to tribes.”104
Regardless of one’s view about the extent of the role that race plays
in determining a person’s status as a tribal member, it is undeniable that
racial heritage plays, at a minimum, some role. This uncomfortable
reality—that a tribal member’s racial heritage is an element of tribal
identity that cannot be ignored—is of immense import when considering
the Court’s attempt to ignore the racial element of tribal classifications.
The requirements for membership in a modern Indian tribe illustrate the
inherently racial nature of membership. For example, the Cherokee
Nation purports to “not require a specific blood quorum” as a condition
for citizenship.105 However, the Nation links citizenship to an applicant’s
ability to identify a direct blood connection to a group of recognized
tribal members:
To be eligible for a federal Certificate Degree of Indian
Blood and Cherokee Nation tribal citizenship, you must
(footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 1376.
104. Id. at 1375; see also Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and
Federal Indian Law, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (2010) (“Today, measures seeking to
restore indigenous peoples to meaningful self-governance and economic health are
challenged as violating prohibitions on equal protection. But the history, purpose, and
context of equal protection and federal Indian policy reveal that special federal treatment
of Indians and tribes is consistent with equal protection and in service of its basic goals.
While an anti-racial discrimination norm is at the core of equal protection, racial
discrimination for Indian peoples had less to do with defining individuals according to
race than with defining tribes as racial groups and denying them sovereignty and property
as a result. Policies that seek to fulfill promises made to tribal governments, rebuild tribal
lands, or restore tribes as political agents with the ability to provide for their people
mitigate the effects of this state-sanctioned racial discrimination. These measures do not
violate equal protection; they further it.”).
105. CHEROKEE
NATION,
About
Citizenship,
http://www.cherokee.org/Services/TribalCitizenship/Citizenship.aspx (last visited April
24, 2014).
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be able to provide documents that connect you to a direct
ancestor listed on the Dawes Final Rolls of Citizens of
the Cherokee Nation with a blood degree. This roll was
taken between 1899-1906 of Citizens and Freedmen
residing in Indian Territory (now northeastern
Oklahoma) prior to Oklahoma statehood in 1907.106
Further, this connection can only “be proven through the biological
parent to the enrolled ancestor.”107 Even the federal government’s
Bureau of Indian Affairs requires direct, biological connection to
previously recognized rolls of tribal members: “You must show your
relationship to an enrolled member(s) of a federally recognized Indian
tribe, whether it is through your birth mother or birth father, or both.”108
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments that any legislative
classification implicating Indian tribal members inherently involves a
racial classification, the Court’s doctrine makes clear that legislative
action affecting tribes need only pass the deferential rational basis level
of scrutiny. Accordingly, equal protection challenges to such federal
laws have routinely failed. Or, more accurately, courts have declined to
entertain the challenges, instead invoking the Mancari Court’s
application of rational basis as settled law. Adoptive Couple,
unfortunately, did nothing to alter the Court’s doctrinal position.
2. The ICWA and Equal Protection
In light of the ICWA’s substantive provisions that apply exclusively
to Indian children,109 one would expect ICWA itself to have prompted
both a healthy amount of constitutional challenges in court and scholarly
criticism on equal protection grounds. However, the Court has largely
ignored ICWA’s inherent equal protection uncertainty, and academia has
not devoted much attention to this issue either.
Until Adoptive Couple, the Court had only taken up a challenge to
ICWA in one case, which did not include any substantive equal
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, CERTIFICATE OF DEGREE OF INDIAN OR ALASKA
NATIVE
BLOOD
INSTRUCTIONS,
(Oct.
31,
2014),
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc002653.pdf.
109. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012) (defining “Indian Child” as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe”).
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protection discussion. That decision, Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, addressed only the meaning of “domicile” for
purposes one of ICWA’s provision, section 1911(a),110 which extends
exclusive jurisdiction to tribes over some custody proceedings.111 The
lower courts have largely avoided the equal protection problems with
ICWA, instead invoking, for instance, the “existing Indian family
doctrine” in order to avoid ICWA’s constitutional difficulties. Part I.A.2,
supra, examined this controversial doctrine in greater depth.112 As Part
IV’s assessment of the decision in Adoptive Couple will more fully
illustrate, even the Adoptive Couple Court was not immune to asserting
the canon of constitutional avoidance in order to avoid tackling head-on
ICWA’s equal protection difficulty.
One of the rare notable lower federal court decisions to address
directly the racial nature of tribal classifications, Williams v. Babbitt in
the Ninth Circuit,113 did not concern ICWA. Rather, the Ninth Circuit
addressed an equal protection challenge to an administrative
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act that prohibited reindeer
herding by non-natives in Alaska.114 Unsurprisingly, the court invoked
the canon of constitutional avoidance, thereby striking down the
agency’s constitutionally troubling interpretation of the Reindeer
Industry Act, in order to sidestep the equal protection problems posed by
such a naked racial preference.115
A full discussion of ICWA’s equal protection flaws has been
lacking in scholarship, as well. The bulk of ICWA’s scholarly treatment
has been devoted to the question of whether the judicially crafted
“existing Indian family doctrine” is meritorious.116 John Robert Renner’s
110. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State
over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled
within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in
the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the
Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile
of the child.”).
111. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48-53 (1989).
112. See supra Part I.A.2.
113. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
114. Id. at 659.
115. Id. at 666 (“The constitutional questions raised by the IBIA's interpretation are
grave and, as intervenors and amici point out, implicate an entire title of the United States
Code. We see no reason to unnecessarily resolve them when a less constitutionally
troubling construction is readily available. We therefore interpret the Reindeer Act as not
precluding non-natives in Alaska from owning and importing reindeer.”).
116. See supra Part I.A.2.
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work might come closest to touching on the specific issues raised by this
Article—ICWA’s inherent equal protection difficulty stemming from the
law’s race-based preferences—but his article is over twenty years old
and largely limits its scope to criticizing proposed amendments to ICWA
offered in the 100th Congress.117 Carole Goldberg’s work, which comes
down on the other side of the equal protection debate, is a notable
exception.118 In one particularly relevant article, she examined ICWA,
along with the Reindeer Industry Act, in order to highlight and criticize
the growing “reconceptualiz[ation of] Indian identity as a racial
identity.”119 However, she relies almost exclusively on a discussion and
analysis of the approach of the California courts as evidence of this racial
“reconceptualization” in the context of ICWA.120 Her reliance on the
doctrinal approach of the intermediate court of one state hardly
constitutes a broader judicial trend, and is susceptible to criticism as a
straw man erected to further her broader goals to criticize
characterization of ICWA and other federal laws as racial classifications.
III. The Saga of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl
This Part provides a detailed overview of the heart-wrenching tale
of Adoptive Couple. Section A begins with an overview of the factual
background, largely relying on the excellent characterization of the facts
provided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Section B then examines
the procedural history of the case and presents an overview of the
rationales underlying the decisions of the South Carolina courts to order
transfer of custody of Baby Girl to Biological Father. This Part concludes
in Section C with a summary of the arguments made before the United
States Supreme Court by the Petitioners, Guardian ad Litem,
Respondents, and the United States as amicus curiae. A thorough and
critical examination of the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple is
reserved for Part V.
A. Factual Background
117. See John Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection
Limitations on the Federal Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 13031, 168-74 (1992).
118. See Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 102, at 1375.
119. Id. at 1375.
120. Id. at 1384-88 (discussing In re Santos Y, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1026 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) and In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
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As is typical in child custody cases, the parties were not named in
the filings and decisions in Adoptive Couple. Thus, this Article uses the
following names to identify the relevant parties: Baby Girl, Biological
Father, Biological Mother, and Adoptive Mother/Father/Couple.
Additionally, this factual overview relies heavily on the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s Adoptive Couple decision, which provided an extensive
overview of the pertinent facts.121
Baby Girl was born in Oklahoma, the child of Biological Father and
Biological Mother, a couple that had once been engaged but never
married.122 Biological Father is a registered member of the Cherokee
Nation, a Bronze Star recipient and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and, at the time of the relevant proceedings, a member of the National
Guard.123 During the course of the pregnancy, Biological Mother broke
off the couple’s engagement, after which point Biological Father failed
to “make any meaningful attempts to contact her” or support her
financially, despite his ability to do so as an active-duty service member
at the time.124
Eventually, Biological Mother sent a text message to Biological
Father asking him to relinquish his parental rights; the South Carolina
Supreme Court described that exchange as follows:
In June 2009, Mother sent a text message to Father
asking if he would rather pay child support or surrender
his parental rights. Father responded via text message
that he would relinquish his rights, but testified that he
believed he was relinquishing his rights to Mother.
Father explained: “In my mind I thought that if I would
do that I’d be able to give her time to think about this
and possibly maybe we would get back together and
continue what we had started.” However, under crossexamination Father admitted that his behavior was not
conducive to being a father. Mother never informed
Father that she intended to place the baby up for
adoption. Father insists that, had he known this, he
121. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 552-56 (S.C. 2012),
vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), remanded to 746 S.E.2d 346 (2013).
122. Id. at 552-53.
123. Id. at 553 n.2.
124. Id. at 553.

29

538

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

would have never considered relinquishing his rights.125
Other parties to the case painted Biological Father’s response and actions
in a more negative light. The Petitioners (Adoptive Couple) noted
Biological Father’s text message renunciation and described Biological
Father’s state of mind at the time: “Father expected Mother to raise the
baby by herself, explaining that he did not feel ‘responsible as a father’
unless Mother married him.”126 The Guardian ad Litem painted a similar
picture: “Birth Father sent a return text message stating that he
surrendered his parental rights . . . . He later testified that he chose to
relinquish his parental rights over paying child support in an effort ‘to
give [Birth Mother] time to think about’ whether she should have ended
their relationship.”127
Biological Mother ultimately chose the adoption route because of
her financial struggles, and decided to pick Adoptive Couple, whom she
met through an adoption agency, because of their stability.128 In fact,
Adoptive Couple, South Carolina residents, “provided financial
assistance to Mother during the final months of her pregnancy and after
Baby Girl’s birth.”129 Adoptive Father—an automotive body
technician—and Adoptive Mother—a doctoral psychologist who works
with families and children with behavior problems—have been married
since 2005 and have no other children.130 While Biological Mother told
Adoptive Couple of Baby Girl’s Indian heritage, they were led by
Biological Mother to believe that Biological Father was not involved.131
Further, Adoptive Couple attempted to verify Biological Father’s tribal
enrollment with the Cherokee Nation, but because of inaccuracies in a
letter sent by their attorney to the Cherokee Nation, they were under the
false impression that Baby Girl was not Cherokee.132
At Biological Mother’s request, Biological Father was not contacted

125. Id.
126. Brief for Petitioners at 7, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013)
(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597 at *7.
127. Brief for Guardian ad Litem, as Representative of Baby Girl, Supporting
Reversal at 15, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013
WL 633603 at *15 (alteration in original).
128. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 553.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 553-54.
132. Id. at 554.
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at all during her stay at the hospital associated with giving birth.133
Adoptive Couple, on the other hand, was present in the delivery room,
and Adoptive Father cut the umbilical cord.134 The next day, Biological
Mother signed the requisite forms renouncing her parental rights and
offering her consent to the adoption; however, Adoptive Couple had to
wait for consent from Oklahoma to move Baby Girl to South Carolina.135
Biological Mother did not identify Baby Girl as “Native American”—she
identified her as “Hispanic”—on the documentation needed for Adoptive
Couple to move Baby Girl to South Carolina, but if Biological Mother
had listed Baby Girl correctly, Adoptive Couple would not have been
able to remove Baby Girl from Oklahoma (although there is some
dispute among the parties on this point).136
B. South Carolina State Proceedings137
A South Carolina family court first considered Adoptive Couple’s
adoption petition.138 Following Biological Father’s victory in the family
Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court certified Adoptive Couple’s
appeal and took up the case.139
1. Family Court
Biological Father made no effort to contact Baby Girl or Biological
Mother following the birth and did not learn of the adoption until almost
four months later via a process server.140 The process server presented
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 554-55, 555 & n.8 (“[H]ad ‘Native American’ been circled on the
[Interstate Compact on Placement of Children] form, the ICPC administrator would have
contacted . . . [the Cherokee Nation]. Whether or not the Cherokee Nation would have
ultimately allowed the adoption to go forward is a matter of tribal law. However, the
testimony establishes the tribe would not have consented to Baby Girl’s removal at that
time, triggering the denial of [Adoptive Couple’s] ICPC application, and [Adoptive
Couple] would not have been able to transport Baby Girl to South Carolina.”); but see
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at 9 (“The adoption consent form identified Baby
Girl’s ethnicity as ‘Caucasian/Native American Indian/Hispanic.’”).
137. This Article omits any discussion of the short-lived Oklahoma proceedings
relevant to the custody struggle over Baby Girl.
138. Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555.
139. Id. at 556.
140. Id. at 555.
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papers associated with Adoptive Couple’s adoption action in South
Carolina, entitled “Acceptance of Service and Answer of Defendant,”
that Biological Father signed and purported to waive his ability to contest
the adoption and other procedural safeguards.141 Ultimately, the
Cherokee Nation intervened in the South Carolina adoption action
pursuant to the ICWA, arguing that Baby Girl was an Indian Child under
the ICWA.142 Biological Father eventually answered the Adoptive
Couple’s complaint, “stating [that] he did not consent to the adoption of
Baby Girl and seeking custody.”143
After Biological Father conclusively established custody, a
Guardian ad Litem—who “recommended that the adoption be approved
in the best interests of the child”144—was appointed, and the family court
held a hearing, the court made its findings, which resulted in a denial of
the adoption petition and an order to transfer custody to Biological
Father:
(1) the ICWA applied and it was not unconstitutional;
(2) the “Existing Indian Family” doctrine was
inapplicable as an exception to the application of the
ICWA in this case in accordance with the clear modern
trend; (3) Father did not voluntarily consent to the
termination of his parental rights or the adoption; and (4)
Appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Father’s parental rights should be
terminated or that granting custody of Baby Girl to
Father would likely result in serious emotional or
physical damage to Baby Girl.145
Biological Father did, in fact, receive custody of Baby Girl, and
they traveled back to Oklahoma.146 Adoptive Couple appealed the family
court’s decision, and the South Carolina Supreme Court certified the
appeal pursuant to state procedure.147

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 556.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at 12.
Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
Id.
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2. Supreme Court
A divided South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family
court’s transfer order. Despite noting that “[u]nder state law, [Biological]
Father’s consent to the adoption would not have been required,”148 the
court nonetheless found the ICWA applicable, thus enabling Biological
Father to block the adoption.149 In so holding, the court also explicitly
rejected the existing Indian family doctrine because “its policy conflicts
with the express purpose of the ICWA. . . .”150 The court also rejected
Adoptive Couple’s argument that the ICWA, by virtue of not “explicitly
set[ting] forth a procedure for an unwed father to acknowledge or
establish paternity,” defers to state law.151 Instead, seemingly contrary to
the language of the ICWA, which excludes from its definition of parents
“the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or
established,”152 the court held that both establishing paternity via DNA
testing and pursuing court proceedings to block adoption were “by its
plain terms . . . all that is required under the ICWA.”153
The court, having found Biological Father to be a “Parent” under
the ICWA, found Biological Father’s relinquishment of parental duties
irrelevant to an analysis couched in the ICWA: “Father’s perceived lack
of interest in or support for Baby Girl during the pregnancy and first four
months of her life as a basis for termination his rights as a parent is not a
valid consideration under the ICWA . . . .”154 In light of the heightened
federal standards for termination of parental rights over an Indian
child,155 the court affirmed the family court’s order “with a heavy heart”
despite describing Adoptive Couple as “ideal parents who have exhibited
the ability to provide a loving family environment for Baby Girl.”156 In
fact, the court felt constrained by the ICWA’s placement preferences—
which embody a presumption that placement within an Indian home is in
the child’s best interest—from even engaging in its traditional placement
preference analysis: “[A]ny attempt to utilize our state’s best interest of

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 560 n.19.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 558 n.17.
Id. at 560.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 560.
Id. at 564 n.26.
See § 1912(f).
Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567.
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the child standard to eclipse the ICWA’s statutory preferences ignores
the fact that the statutory placement preferences [of the ICWA] and the
Indian child’s best interests are not mutually exclusive
considerations.”157
C. Parties’ Arguments Before the United States Supreme
Court
The two questions presented in the case were:
(1) Whether a non-custodial parent can invoke ICWA
[the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-63,] to block an adoption voluntarily and
lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent under state law
[; and (2)] whether ICWA defines “parent” in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has
not complied with state law rules to attain legal status as
a parent.158
The sections that follow provide a brief summary of the major arguments
that the parties made before the U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Petitioners159
Petitioners made a four-part argument essentially grounded in their
contention that the ICWA should not have blocked South Carolina courts
from applying state law to Baby Girl’s adoption proceedings. First,
Petitioners argued that the ICWA’s definition of “parent” excludes
unwed fathers without substantive parental rights under relevant state
law.160 More precisely, Petitioners said “[t]he Act does not resuscitate
parental rights for unwed fathers who under state law repudiated those
very rights and flouted their parental responsibilities to the pregnant
mother and child.”161
157. Id.
158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct.
831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 4502948 at *i.
159. Lisa S. Blatt of Arnold & Porter LLP was Counsel of Record for Adoptive
Couple, the Petitioners. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126.
160. See id. at *20-29.
161. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 126, at *20.
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Second, Petitioners suggested that even if Biological Father met the
ICWA’s definition of “parent,” he should still be unable to assert the
ICWA’s substantive protections because he never had custody of Baby
Girl and the ICWA’s purpose was to protect Indian children from being
removed from Indian parents, families, and reservations.162 Largely
invoking the existing Indian family doctrine, Petitioners asserted:
Even if the state court correctly interpreted the term
“parent,” reversal still is required because the court
further erred in holding that ICWA creates custodial
rights and creates Indian families anew—i.e., when they
would not otherwise exist under state or tribal law.
Specifically, Sections 1912(d) and (f) do not permit a
noncustodial father to veto the adoptive choices made by
a non-Indian mother when state law confers on the
mother sole custodial rights with respect to the Indian
child.163
Third, Petitioners argued that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ICWA raised “grave constitutional concerns under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Tenth
Amendment,”164 and they suggested that the canon of constitutional
doubt counseled against such a troublesome interpretation.165
Fourth, Petitioners claimed that application of the ICWA’s Indian
child placement preferences to a situation where there is no preexisting
family “would impose a de facto ban on interracial adoptions and punish
countless abandoned Indian children in need of adoptive homes.”166
2. Guardian ad Litem167

162. See id. at *29-43.
163. Id. at *29.
164. Id. at *17.
165. Id. at *43; see also id. at *43-51.
166. Id. at *19; see also id. at *51-57.
167. Paul D. Clement of Bancroft PLLC was Counsel of Record for Guardian ad
Litem, “the duly appointed representative of the respondent child (‘Baby Girl’) . . . with
standing to file this brief on Baby Girl’s behalf.” Brief for Guardian ad Litem, as
Representative of Baby Girl, Supporting Reversal at *1, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633603 at *1.
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The Guardian ad Litem made a two-pronged argument, focusing
first on interpretation of the ICWA in light of its text and purpose and
second on the constitutional implications of the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s decision.
First, the Guardian ad Litem argued that the lower court incorrectly
interpreted the ICWA by finding the substantive provisions of the ICWA
applicable to Baby Girl and treating Biological Father as a “parent.”
With respect to the former point, the Guardian ad Litem advocated that
the existing Indian family doctrine served as a bar to application of the
ICWA: “Throughout [the] ICWA, Congress included language triggered
only by previous legal or physical custody by the Indian parent, or at
least some sort of state action preventing the Indian parent from
obtaining legal or physical custody of the child.”168 On the latter point,
the Guardian ad Litem argued that the lower court failed to appreciate
that the ICWA incorporated state or tribal law with respect to the
procedures necessary to determine paternity: “[T]he lower court ignored
a much more logical reading of the statute that would explain Congress’
decision to use the phrase ‘acknowledged or established’ unelaborated
and undefined: ICWA meant to incorporate state or tribal law as to when
unwed father’s paternity is acknowledged or established.”169
Second, the Guardian ad Litem focused on the constitutional rights
of Baby Girl. More specifically, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the ICWA, according to the Guardian ad Litem,
deprived Baby Girl of “a best interests determination focused [solely] on
her own well-being,”170 subjected Baby Girl to a racial classification in
violation of equal protection,171 and violated her fundamental liberty
interests associated “maintaining the only family bonds she has ever
known, absent a showing of necessity.”172
3. Respondent Biological Father173
Biological Father made four main arguments before the Court,

168. Id. at *29; see also id. at *31-41.
169. Id. at *29; see also id. at *41-48.
170. Id. at *30; see also id. at *49-53.
171. Id. at *53-55.
172. Id. at *56; see also id. at *56-59.
173. Charles A. Rothfeld of Mayer Brown LLP was Counsel of Record for
Respondent Biological Father. See Brief for Respondent Birth Father, Adoptive Couple v.
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1191183.
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urging affirmance of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision. First,
Biological Father argued that he qualified as a “parent” under the ICWA
because he “‘acknowledged’ his paternity by declaring that he is Baby
Girl’s father and bringing suit to establish that fact . . . [and,] he
‘established’ it through a conclusive DNA test” in conformity with the
plain meaning of the statute.174 Second, Biological Father brushed aside
Petitioners’ argument that the existing Indian family doctrine should bar
applicability in the dispute because the “text makes no reference to any
such doctrine, and the manifest congressional intent—apparent in the
statutory language, structure, and background—precludes any such ‘preexisting custody’ requirement.”175 As a result, Biological Father argued,
the ICWA’s provisions governing termination of parental rights over an
Indian child should apply.176 Third, Biological Father contended that §
1915, which provides placement preferences for Indian children, should
independently block petitioners’ attempted adoption.177 Fourth,
Biological Father rejected each of the constitutional challenges to the
ICWA noting that the law does not run afoul of equal protection
principles because “Congress properly acted on the basis of sovereignty
rather than race to bolster Tribes as political entities,” the ICWA asapplied to Baby Girl does not upset federalism given “Congress’ plenary
power with respect to Indian Tribes,” and “the Court has never
recognized the extravagant substantive due process rights” claimed by
Petitioners on behalf of Biological Mother and Baby Girl.178
4. Respondent Cherokee Nation179
The Cherokee Nation’s arguments mirrored closely, in substance,
those of Biological Father. Briefly, the Cherokee Nation argued the
ICWA applied because Baby Girl is an Indian child under the ICWA,
which applies to child custody proceedings involving such children and,
in the alternative, that the ICWA’s substantive placement preferences in

174. Id. at *18; see also id. at *21-27.
175. Id. at *19; see also id. at *18-19.
176. Id. at *28-46.
177. Id. at *46-49.
178. Id. at *20; see also id. at *49-54.
179. Chrissi Ross Nimmo, Assistant Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation was
Counsel of Record for Respondent Cherokee Nation. See Brief for Respondent Cherokee
Nation, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL
1225770.
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§ 1915 would require placement with Biological Father.180 They also
suggested that the Court not follow the existing Indian family doctrine,
which the Cherokee Nation characterized as inconsistent with both the
text and purpose of the ICWA.181 Lastly, relying on Congress’ broad
power over Indian affairs and the uniquely sovereign status of Indian
tribes, the Cherokee Nation rejected any equal protection or substantive
due process challenges to the ICWA.182
5. United States as Amicus Curiae183
Highlighting the importance of the case to relations between the
federal government and Indian tribes, the United States filed an amicus
brief supporting affirmance of the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
decision to award custody to Biological Father.184 Relying on the
“substantial interest [of the United States] in the case because Congress
enacted ICWA in furtherance of ‘the special relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal
responsibility to Indian people,’”185 the United States made a fivepronged argument in support of affirmance.186
First, the United States argued that the ICWA is applicable to Baby
Girl’s adoption proceeding, thereby rejecting the existing Indian family
doctrine because the “ICWA’s plain language forecloses any such
exemption, and vague appeals to statutory purpose cannot surmount that
barrier.”187 Second, arguing that Biological Father “established” and
“acknowledged” his paternity by submitting to a DNA test and pursuing
state court avenues, the United States suggested that the ICWA did not
incorporate state law and, even if it did, Biological Father had
nonetheless complied with South Carolina’s paternity procedures.188
Third, the United States contended that Biological Father’s parental
rights could not be terminated because no remedial efforts had been

180. Id. at *12-22.
181. Id. at *22-27.
182. Id. at *27-53.
183. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. was Counsel of Record for the United
States. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1099169.
184. Id. at *8.
185. Id. at *1 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012)).
186. Id. at *8.
187. Id. at *8; see also id. at *10-14.
188. Id. at *8; see also id. at *14-19.
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undertaken as required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).189 Fourth, suggesting that
the South Carolina Supreme Court’s holding could be affirmed based
solely on section 1912(d), the United States argued that the Court should
not address the South Carolina Court’s erroneous conclusion that section
1912(f) also barred termination of Biological Father’s parental rights
because “[c]ontinued custody is a predicate to application of” section
1912(f) and the lower court never determined whether Biological Father
had the requisite custody.190 Fifth, the United States dismissed any of the
constitutional challenges to the ICWA and its application to Baby Girl by
referencing Congress’s plenary authority over Indian affairs; rejecting
equal protection arguments by pointing to the political distinctions, rather
than racial ones, rooted in tribal sovereignty at play in the ICWA; and
disregarding any substantive due process right on the part of either Baby
Girl or Biological Mother to escape Congress’s best interests
determinations with respect to Indian children.191
IV. The Court’s Missed Opportunity in Adoptive Couple
It should come as no surprise that the Court in Adoptive Couple
avoided addressing the elephant in the room—ICWA’s obvious equal
protection problem—by stretching and shaping ICWA’s text and purpose
to suit the Court’s needs. Indeed, the Roberts Court’s legacy may very
well be characterized by its willingness to apply the canon of
constitutional avoidance with both rigor and frequency.192 This kind of
judicial humility and restraint is certainly worthy of praise in many
contexts, but ICWA’s constitutional flaws are so profound and inherent

189. Id. at *8-9; see also id. at *20-23; cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (“Any party seeking
to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”).
190. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, supra note
183; Id. at *9; see also id. at *23-26.
191. See id. at *9-10; see also id. at *26-33.
192. For instance, in the Court’s recent opinion in Bond v. United States, the
Roberts Court again adopted a strained textual interpretation of a statute in order to avoid
the obvious constitutional problem central to the case. See Bond v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 2077, 2090–93 (2014). Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which embraced Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz’s work in Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005),
lamented the majority’s decision to avoid the constitutional question. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at
2094–97, 2098 (“Since the Act is clear, the real question this case presents is whether the
Act is constitutional as applied to petitioner.”).
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in the law’s substantive provisions that the Court’s refusal to address
them in Adoptive Couple was lamentable.
This Part will first summarize and discuss the Court’s decision in
Adoptive Couple, identifying briefly what issues the Court declined to
resolve and, while building on the doctrines examined supra, criticizing
the Adoptive Couple Court’s result. Then, this Part concludes with a
short epilogue describing the ultimate resolution of Baby Girl’s adoption
proceedings.
A. What the Court Decided
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and held that ICWA did not bar the termination
of Biological Father’s parental rights.193 Justice Alito wrote the majority
opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, and Thomas.194 Justices Thomas and Breyer filed concurring
opinions,195 while Justices Scalia and Sotomayor (joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia, in part) filed dissenting opinions.196
The majority opinion turned on the Court’s interpretation of two
provisions of ICWA: section 1912(f), which creates a heightened
threshold for terminating the parental rights of an Indian child,197 and
section 1912(d), which requires remedial efforts as a precondition to
breaking up an Indian family.198 The Court also clarified the meaning of
193. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013).
194. Id. at 2556.
195. Id. at 2566-71 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that constitutional avoidance
compelled the Court’s opinion because of ICWA’s regulation of Indians individually,
rather than as tribal members, and ICWA’s potential scope beyond those powers granted
to Congress via the Indian Commerce Clause); id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(raising policy concerns posed by the Court’s decision and expressing his view regarding
the limit of the majority opinion).
196. Id. at 2571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering an alternative definition of
“continued custody” and lamenting the Court’s demeaning of the rights of parenthood);
id. at 2572-86 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s reading of ICWA
as “contrary to both its text and stated purpose” on a host of grounds).
197. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012) (“No termination of parental rights may be ordered
in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.”).
198. Id. § 1912(d) (“Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court
that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
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section 1915(a), which creates placement preferences for adoptions of
Indian children.199 However, the Court’s opinion cannot be understood
completely without acknowledging the majority’s desire to circumvent
any constitutional problems posed by ICWA’s unique treatment of
Indian children and parents:
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to help
preserve the cultural identity and heritage of Indian
tribes, but under the State Supreme Court’s reading, the
Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great
disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote
one—was an Indian. As the State Supreme Court read §§
1912(d) and (f), a biological Indian father could abandon
his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth
mother—perhaps contributing to the mother’s decision
to put the child up for adoption—and then could play his
ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the
mother’s decision and the child’s best interests. If this
were possible, many prospective adoptive parents would
surely pause before adopting any child who might
possibly qualify as an Indian under the ICWA. Such an
interpretation would raise equal protection concerns . . .
.200
Thus, the Court recognized ICWA’s equal protection problems, but came
to a result via textual interpretation in order to avoid tackling head-on the
weighty constitutional issues.201 Justice Sotomayor understood the
majority to come to its conclusion based on this justification; although,
she pointed to the Court’s previous Indian law cases, such as Mancari,202
to argue that ICWA did not pose any constitutional difficulty: “It is
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have
proved unsuccessful.”).
199. Id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement
with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's
tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”).
200. Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2565 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
201. Justice Alito’s opinion, however, purports to identify these equal protection
problems while claiming to rely on “the plain text of §§ 1912(f) and (d)” in deciding the
dispute. Id.
202. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974); see also supra Part II.B.1.
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difficult to make sense of this suggestion [that a contrary result would
create equal protection problems] in light of our precedents, which
squarely hold that classifications based on Indian tribal membership are
not impermissible racial classifications.”203
Turning back to the meat of the opinion, the Court’s textual analysis
focused on section 1912(f) and section 1912(d) of ICWA. The Court
found that section 1912(f)’s requirement of a heightened showing of
harm as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights applies only to
parents with existing custody of an Indian child: “section 1912(f) does
not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the
Indian child . . . [because ‘continued custody’ in section 1912(f)] refers
to custody that a parent already has (or at least had at some point in the
past).”204 Thus, because Biological Father “never had legal or physical
custody of Baby Girl as of the time of the adoption proceedings,”
Biological Father should not have been able to invoke the protections of
section 1912(f) to block Baby Girl’s adoption.205 Employing similar
interpretive tools, the Court found that section 1912(d)’s remedial
requirements applied only to termination of parental rights where such
termination would actually breakup the existing family.206 More
precisely, the Court held “that section 1912(d) applies only in cases
where an Indian family’s ‘breakup’ would be precipitated by the
termination of the parent’s rights” and defined “[t]he term ‘breakup’ . . .
in this context [as] ‘the discontinuance of a relationship’ or ‘an ending as
an effective entity.’”207 Part I.A.2’s discussion of the “existing Indian
family doctrine” is particularly illuminating and relevant given the
implicit centrality of the doctrine to the Court’s ultimate holding (with
respect to section 1912(f) and section 1912(d)).208
B. What the Court Left Unanswered
The Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple is, in a sense, a
quintessential Roberts Court opinion. It is written in such a way as to
203. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 55354 (1974)).
204. Id. at 2560
205. Id. at 2562.
206. Id. at 2562-63.
207. Id. at 2562 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 235 (3d Ed. 1992) and
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 273 (1961)).
208. See supra Part I.A.2.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1

42

2014]

TRIBES AND RACE

551

limit its impact beyond the precise issues before the Court, interpret the
meaning of the relevant statutory text in a manner that is both not
unreasonable and consistent with the majority’s broader goals in the
case, and avoid reaching an outcome that would significantly alter
precedent and force the Court to decide weighty constitutional questions.
Looking back to the parties’ arguments, discussed in Part III.C, the Court
left unanswered two principal issues raised by the parties: first, the
meaning of “parent” under the ICWA209 and, second, a clear resolution
of whether the ICWA—and, more broadly, laws generally benefitting or
classifying Indians—trigger the court’s strict scrutiny level of review
reserved for racial classifications.
1. ICWA and Putative Fatherhood
First, the Court explicitly declined to resolve the issue of whether
Biological Father is actually a “parent” under the ICWA: “We need
not—and therefore do not—decide whether Biological Father is a
‘parent.’”210 This assumption—necessary for the court to undertake its
interpretation of § 1912—allowed the Court to avoid a messy discussion
of the law of putative fatherhood. Recall that a “parent” under the ICWA
is “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian
person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions
under tribal law or custom.”211 However, the ICWA’s definition of parent
“does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been
acknowledged or established.”212
The Court’s decision not to resolve this question of what “parent”
means is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that this exact issue
was one of the two questions presented in the case,213 and it was a source

209. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4 (“If Biological Father is not a ‘parent’
under the ICWA, then § 1912(f) and § 1912(d)—which relate to proceedings involving
possible termination of ‘parental’ rights—are inapplicable. Because we conclude that
these provisions are inapplicable for other reasons, however, we need not decide whether
Biological Father is a ‘parent.’”).
210. Id. at 2560.
211. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012).
212. Id.
213. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.
Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2012 WL 4502948 at *i (“(2) [w]hether ICWA defines
‘parent’ in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) to include an unwed biological father who has not
complied with state law rules to attain legal status as a parent.”).
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of disagreement among the parties.214 Part III.C briefly outlined the
parties’ arguments on this issue, among others.215 By declining to resolve
this debate surrounding the ICWA’s interaction with putative fatherhood
doctrine, the Court was also able to sidestep the question, examined in
Part I.B of whether the ICWA’s definition of parent imported state law
paternity requirements or was limited to the ICWA’s own statutory
meaning.216 Thus, the majority maintained the status quo ante with
respect to the Court’s putative fatherhood jurisprudence.
There is already wide disagreement among many states, the
populations of which account for a significant share of this country’s
Indian population, about how to interpret ICWA’s definition of “parent.”
These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Missouri, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.217 The Court’s decision does
nothing to resolve this inconsistency in the state courts. Unfortunately,
both America’s Indian population of unwed fathers and prospective
adoptive parents of this community’s children are left to fight these
issues in state courts with little hope of consistent application of ICWA
across state lines.
2. The Equal Protection Problem
Second, and most importantly, the Court completely and
purposefully avoided any resolution of the weighty equal protection
issues raised in Adoptive Couple. Aside from a few sentences alluding to
the potential constitutional problems that might result from application of
the ICWA to Baby Girl’s adoption,218 the Court used the ICWA’s
statutory text as a useful life raft to avoid the choppy waters of ICWA’s
fundamental equal protection flaws. All of the parties briefed the

214. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 19-29, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.
Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597, at *19-29, and Brief for Guardian ad
Litem at 31-48, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013
WL 633603 at *31-48, with Brief for Respondent Cherokee Nation at 12-22, Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1225770, at *12-22,
and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14-19,
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1099169, at
*14-19.
215. See supra Part III.C.
216. See supra Part I.B.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
218. See supra text accompanying note 200.
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constitutional issues to some degree,219 and as Part II made abundantly
clear, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence with respect to both
adoption and laws implicating Indians are in serious need of
reevaluation.220 Adoptive Couple was the ideal opportunity for such an
undertaking by the Court.
More specifically, the Court’s failure to address the obvious equal
protection issues at play in ICWA will only perpetuate the legal fiction
necessary to justify rational basis of review of Indian classifications: that
tribal classifications do not act as or implicate racial classifications.
Recall ICWA’s definitions of “Indian Child:” “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”221 These provisions explicitly
require a biological link to tribal members by pointing toward tribal
membership (or eligibility) to trigger ICWA’s application. Given the
reality that tribal membership is linked to one’s biological ties to
previously recognized tribal members,222 this kind of biological
requirement is quite obviously a racial one. The Court’s failure to
acknowledge this reality will only perpetuate the divisive nature of laws,
like ICWA, that afford Indians disparate treatment based, at least in part,
on their racial heritage.
This Article is not alone in scholarship in recognizing the racial
nature of such classifications,223 and even the Ninth Circuit in Babbitt—
discussed in Part II.B.2—felt compelled to strike down an agency
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act in light of the clear racial
nature of tribal classifications in order to avoid a constitutionally
troubling outcome.224 Until the Court resolves this contradiction in its
increasing embrace of colorblindness in equal protection cases, ICWA
and similar laws will perpetuate disparate treatment of Indians under the
law and condition application of such legislative measures on one’s

219. See supra Part III.C.
220. See supra Part II; see also infra Part IV.C.
221. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012).
222. See, e.g., text accompanying note 105.
223. See supra Part II.B.1.
224. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The constitutional
questions raised by the IBIA's interpretation are grave and, as intervenors and amici point
out, implicate an entire title of the United States Code. We see no reason to unnecessarily
resolve them when a less constitutionally troubling construction is readily available. We
therefore interpret the Reindeer Act as not precluding non-natives in Alaska from owning
and importing reindeer.” (footnote omitted)).
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blood heritage. What could be more anathema to the text and spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equality under the law?
C. An Epilogue
Throughout the remarkable and dramatic saga of Adoptive Couple, a
young child’s future was ultimately hanging in the balance. This human
element was heart-wrenching and made the case that much more worthy
of careful consideration and resolution. The United States Supreme
Court’s decision did not, however, resolve ultimately what would happen
to Baby Girl.
The South Carolina Supreme Court responded to the United States
Supreme Court’s reversal and remand by ordering the family court to
approve and finalize “Adoptive Couple’s adoption of Baby Girl, thereby
terminating [Biological] Father’s parental rights.”225 The South Carolina
Supreme Court subsequently denied petitions for rehearing submitted by
Biological Father and the Cherokee Nation, leaving only unresolved
“[t]he matter of transfer of physical custody” of Baby Girl, to be
determined by the family court in accordance with Baby Girl’s best
interests.226
Unfortunately, that transfer was accompanied by further drama:
after Biological Father—who was engaged in annual military training
with his Oklahoma National Guard unit in Iowa227—failed to appear with
Baby Girl on August 4, 2013 in South Carolina for a court-ordered
meeting with Adoptive Couple as part of the transition of custody plan,
South Carolina authorities issued a warrant for the arrest of Biological
Father.228 After legal wrangling, additional lawsuits, and a political
225. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 54 (S.C. 2013).
226. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 346, 347 (S.C. 2013).
227. A Cherokee tribal court granted temporary custody of Baby Girl to Biological
Father’s parents and wife while he was attending Oklahoma National Guard training. See
Dan Frosch, Custody Battle Continues Despite Ruling by Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/14/us/custody-battle-continues-despite-rulingbyjustices.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%5B%22RI%3A5%22%2
C%22RI%3A16%22%5D.
228. See, e.g., Meg Kinnard, Adoptive Couple Wants Feds to Bring Girl to SC,
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/adoptive-couple-wants-fedsbring-girl-sc-125306465.html; Dusten Brown, ‘Baby Girl’ Veronica’s Birth Father,
Faces Arrest Warrant in Adoption Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/11/sc-authorities-issue-warrant-dustenbrown_n_3739674.html.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/1

46

2014]

TRIBES AND RACE

555

standoff between the governors of Oklahoma and South Carolina,229
Adoptive Couple finally gained custody of Baby Girl on September 23,
2013.230 Weeks later, Biological Father announced that he would drop all
litigation aimed at gaining custody of Baby Girl, saying that “[i]t was no
longer fair for [Baby Girl] to be in the middle of a battle.”231
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s doctrinal
failure—and the pain and anguish felt by all parties involved in this
case—perhaps the silver lining in this saga is the fact that Baby Girl
might have a settled and fulfilling future after all.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court was presented with the ideal opportunity to both
rectify its approach to laws singling out Indian tribal members for
disparate treatment and provide clarification regarding the ICWA’s
application to putative fathers. On both fronts, the Court failed to provide
any meaningful resolution. With respect to the first issue, federal law
will regrettably continue to ignore the intrinsic racial nature of any tribal
classification, thereby perpetuating the legal fiction necessary to sustain
the Court’s deferential approach to resolving equal protection challenges
to laws implicating Indian tribes. The ICWA will persist as an awkward
exception to the Court’s otherwise steady embrace of colorblindness, in
adoption and beyond.
The Court’s refusal to resolve the ICWA’s ambiguity regarding
putative fatherhood rights is similarly disappointing and leaves putative
fathers, Indian children, and adoptive couples uncertain about the scope
of the ICWA’s application. Given the existing conflict among the
states—many of which having sizable populations impacted by the
ICWA—on this question of the ICWA’s scope, the Court will likely be
229. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Ruling in Baby Veronica Case
Leads to More Legal Wrangling, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-courts-ruling-in-baby-veronica-caseleads-to-more-legal-wrangling-over-adoption/2013/09/15/7207be1c-1caf-11e3-86855021e0c41964_story.html.
230. Cherokee Girl Is Handed Over to Adoptive Parents, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/cherokee-girl-is-handed-over-to-adoptiveparents.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%5B%22RI%3A5%22%2
C%22RI%3A16%22%5D.
231. Michael Overall, Baby Veronica Case: Dusten Brown To Stop Custody Fight
for Veronica, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/babyveronica-case-dusten-brown-to-stop-custody-fight-for/article_2d903520-319a-11e3-abf10019bb30f31a.html.
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forced to take up this question again soon, as is often the case when the
Court leaves tough questions for future resolution.
Judicial restraint and humility are often laudable characteristics of a
praiseworthy tribunal, but the Court in Adoptive Couple should not have
left open these profound questions of constitutional uncertainty.
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